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Mackston v. State of New York 864
(decided January 31, 1994)
The plaintiff brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that
the application of the former Judiciary Law section 221-g (now
section 221-i), which provided an unfavorable salary differential
between the judges of the City Court of the City of Long Beach
and the judges of the City Court of White Plains, was
unconstitutional and violative of his right to the equal protection
of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution. 865 The second department held that former
Judiciary Law section 221-g was not unconstitutional and did not
866
violate the plaintiff's right to equal protection of the laws.
The plaintiff, a retired judge from the City Court of the City of
Long Beach, Nassau County, brought this suit some time after
the Unified Court Budget Act was enacted on April 1, 1977,867
seeking a declaratory judgment that the former Judiciary Law
section 221-g violated his equal protection right under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 868 In addition to the declaratory
judgment, the plaintiff sought monetary relief, consisting of
retroactive pay increases, including interest and attorney's
fees. 869 After finding that the state lacked any rational basis for
creating a statutory disparity of salaries between the judges of
City Courts of Long Beach and White Plains, the trial court

864.

__

A.D.2d

_,

607 N.Y.S.2d 357 (2d Dep't 1994).

865. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part that: "No
State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
866. Mackston, __ A.D.2d at __, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
867. The New York Court of Appeals in Weissman v. Evans, noted that the
Unified Court Budget Act provided that "judicial personnel were henceforth
State employees and that, concordantly, they would be placed on the State
payroll on April 1, 1977" for the purpose of creating a state unified court
system that is "unimpeded by artificial local boundaries and the diverse
competing needs of local governmental agencies." 56 N.Y.2d 458, 462, 438
N.E.2d 397, 398, 452 N.Y.S.2d 864, 865 (1982).
868. Mackston, __ A.D.2d at __, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
869. Ild. at
607 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
_,
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granted the plaintiff both the declaratory judgment and the
870
monetary relief sought.
In reversing the trial court, the appellate division reaffirmed the
New York Court of Appeals' well-settled holdings in Cass v.
State871 and Weissman v. Evans872 that, in evaluating the

"constitutionality of a statutorily created judicial pay disparity
among Judges of comparable courts," the geographical
distinctions between the areas where the courts are situated must
be based upon a rational basis. 873 The court reasoned that, based
upon governmental statistics, because the full-time population and
cost of living in White Plains were found to be greater and
substantially higher, respectively, than that of Long Beach, there
870. Id. at

_,

607 N.Y.S.2d at 358-59.

871. 58 N.Y.2d 460, 448 N.E.2d 786, 461 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1983). In Cass,
the court of appeals affirmed that a "State budgetary act 'will not be struck as
violative of equal protection merely because it creates differences in
geographical areas .... As long as the State had a rational basis for making
such a distinction, it will pass constitutional muster under an equal protection
challenge.'" Id. at 463-64, 448 N.E.2d at 787, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 1002 (quoting
Tolub v. Evans, 58 N.Y.2d 1, 8, 444 N.E.2d 1, 4, 457 N.Y.S.2d 751, 754
(1982)).
872. 56 N.Y.2d 458, 438 N.E.2d 397, 452 N.Y.S.2d 864 (1982). In
Weissman, the court of appeals held that there was no rational basis for the
disparate judicial salaries between the District Court Judges of Suffolk County
District Court and of Nassau County District Court because there was no
geographic distinction to justify such disparity in similar adjacent counties on
Long Island. Id. at 466, 438 N.E.2d at 400-01 452 N.Y.S.2d at 867-68. The
court of appeals stated the applicable rule that "while equal protection does not
necessarily require territorial uniformity

. .

. '[a] territorial distinction which

has no rational basis will not support a state statute.'" Id. at 464-65, 438
N.E.2d at 400, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 867 (quoting Manes v. Goldin, 400 F. Supp.
23, 29 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd 423 U.S. 1068 (1976)). The court further noted
that although geographical distinctions "'are not, in and of themselves,
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment ...

a state must demonstrate ...

that

the classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary but rests upon some
reasonable consideration of difference or policy.'" Id. at 465, 438 N.E.2d at
400, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 867 (quoting Levy v. Parker, 346 F. Supp. 897, 902
(E.D. La. 1972) aff'd 411 U.S. 978 (1973)). See also Weissman v. Bellacosa,
129 A.D.2d 189, 517 N.Y.S.2d 734 (2d Dep't. 1987) (extending the holding in
Weissman to include County Court Judges of Suffolk and Nassau Counties).
873. Mackston,

A.D.2d at

_,

607 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
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was such rational basis for the disparate salaries on the basis of
geography. 874 The court specifically noted that between 1981 and
1982, the cost of purchasing a residential home in White Plains
was twice the amount of one on Long Island, and the per capita
property taxes were higher in White Plains than in Long
Beach. 875 Consequently, because it was more expensive to live in
White Plains than in Long Beach, the court held that Judiciary
Law section 221-g, which allows the geographically disparate
salaries between the judges of the City Court of Long Beach and
the judges of City Court of White Plains, was supported by a
rational basis, was not unconstitutional and did not violate
plaintiff's right to the equal protection of laws under the
876
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
If this suit was brought under the New York State Constitution,
article I, section 11, the outcome of the case would probably
have been the same. 877 In Burke v. Crosson,87 8 the plaintiffs,
County Court Judges of Onondaga County, brought suit seeking
to declare that Judiciary Law section 221-d deprived them of
equal protection of laws under both the New York State and
Federal Constitutions. 879 In Burke, the court held that "the
significantly higher cost of living in Nassau, Suffolk and
Westchester Counties provides a rational basis for the
geographically disparate salaries between those counties and
Onondaga County." 880

874. Id. at
875. Id. at
876. Id. at

_,
___,
,

607 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
607 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
607 N.Y.S.2d at 359. The court stated that "as long as any

conceivable statement of facts will support a classification by the Legislature,
it cannot be held to be violative of equal protection." Id. at __, 607 N.Y.S.2d
at 359 (citing Maresca v. Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 242, 250, 475 N.E.2d 95, 98,
485 N.Y.S.2d 724, 727 (1984)).
877. Similar to United States Constitution, amendment XIV, § 1, cl. 3, the
New York State Constitution, article I, § 11 provides that "[n]o person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision
thereof." N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
878. 191 A.D.2d 997, 595 N.Y.S.2d 272 (4th Dep't 1993).
879. Id. at 997, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
880. Id. at 998, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
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However, in another fourth department case, Barth v.
Crosson,881 however, the court held that "because Onondaga,
Oneida, Erie and Monroe Counties are all located within the
Fourth Department," there was no rational basis for the
geographically disparate salaries of the family court judges within
those counties. 882 The plaintiffs, family court judges serving
Onondaga and Oneida Counties, sought a declaratory judgment
that Judiciary Law section 221-e, which provides disparate
salaries between them and judges serving in twelve other counties
in the state violated their right to equal protection under the State
and Federal Constitutions. 883 In regard to Onondaga, Oneida,
Erie and Monroe Counties, the court specifically noticed that the
duties, responsibilities, and caseloads among the Family Court
Judges were "comparable," while the differentials in the costs of
living among those counties were "insignificant." 884 In addition,
the court reasoned that, because there was a "'true unity of...
judicial interest ... indistinguishable by separate geographic
considerations [among the counties in question]," the plaintiffs
were entitled to their declaratory judgment.885 The court,
however, distinguished Erie and Monroe Counties from the other
nine counties. 886 The court held that, because of the "higher cost
of living in those first and second department counties, as
compared to Onondaga and Oneida counties, [there was] a
rational basis for the geographically disparate salaries." 887
In the case at bar, the plaintiff, a retired judge of the City
Court of White Plains, served Westchester County, while judges
881. _ A.D.2d
, 607 N.Y.S.2d 200 (4th Dep't 1993).
882. Id. at
,607 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
883. Id. at
,607 N.Y.S.2d at 201. See N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11; U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § cl. 3.
884. Barth,
A.D.2d at
607 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
_,

885. Id. at

607 N.Y.S.2d at 201 (quoting Davis v. Rosenblatt, 159

A.D.2d 163, 171, 559 N.Y.S.2d 401, 405-06 (3d Dep't 1990) (quoting
Weissman v. Evans, 56 N.Y.2d 458, 463, 438 N.E.2d 397, 399, 452
N.Y.S.2d 864, 866 (1982))).
886. Id. at _,
607 N.Y.S.2d at 201. The nine counties were the Bronx,

Dutchess, Kings, Nassau, Orange, Queens, Rockland, Suffolk and Westchester
Counties.
887. Id. at

_,

607 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
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of the City Court of Long Beach served Nassau County. Both
counties are within the second department. Although plaintiff
may have argued that the costs of living in Nassau and
Westchester, second department counties, were found to be
significantly higher than in Onondaga or Oneida, fourth
department counties, the costs of living in Long Beach was also
significantly lower than in White Plains. Thus, as in Mackston,
state and federal constitutional geographical distinctions are not
limited only between counties and appellate departments, but also
between the cities within the counties, as well as within the
appellate departments. Furthermore, even if the duties,
responsibilities, and caseloads among the city court judges in
both White Plains and Long Beach, as reasoned in Barth, were
shown to be comparable, a rational basis for geographically
disparate salaries may still be satisfied by demonstrating a
significant differential in population, and cost of living. 888
Therefore, even if the suit had been brought under the New York
State Constitution, it is likely that the outcome would have been
the same.
People v. Peart889
(decided October 12, 1993)

Defendant claimed that his right to equal protection, pursuant

to the State 8 90 and Federal 8 9 1 Constitutions, was violated because

888. See Edelstein v. Crosson, 187 A.D.2d 694, 590 N.Y.S.2d 277 (2d
Dep't 1992). In Edelstein, the plaintiffs, six County Court Judges from
Dutchess, Rockland, and Orange Counties, submitted evidence that
demonstrated the similarity between their caseloads and the caseloads of the
Westchester County Court Judges, while the defendants submitted evidence
that demonstrated that the population and the cost of living in Westchester
County were higher than in Dutchess, Rockland, and Orange Counties. Id. at
696, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 278. The court held that there was a rational basis for
the disparate salaries where the average home in Westchester was sold in late
1987 for $361,094 while in late 1987, an average home in Orange County sold
for $132,050. By contrast, in Rockland County the average home sold for
$185,000 in 1988, and in Dutchess County, for $149,270, in 1989. Id.
889. 197 A.D.2d 599, 602 N.Y.S.2d 424 (2d Dep't 1993).
890. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof.").
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the prosecutor's use of its peremptory challenge was racially
discriminatory. 892 The Appellate Division, Second Department
held that the defendant's right to equal protection was violated
because the prosecutor failed to give a race-neutral explanation
for its use of its peremptory challenges. 893
On March 8, 1991, the defendant was convicted of "criminal
sale of a controlled substance in the third degree" and "criminal
possession of a controlled substance in the third degree." 894
During voir dire, the prosecutor peremptorily challenged the only
two black members on the venire panel. 895 The defendant
objected to the exclusion of these potential jurors as a violation of
Batson v. Kentucky. 896 The prosecutor explained that although
the potential juror was "neutral," she was not a "strong"
prosecution juror. 897 In addition, the prosecutor failed to point to
any facts in support of these feelings.898 The trial court
concluded that the prosecutor provided a race-neutral explanation
and thus, excluded the juror. 899 The defendant was subsequently
convicted of both charges and appealed. 900
The Appellate Division, Second Department found that the
defendant's right to equal protection had been violated, reasoning
that the prosecution failed to provide a race-neutral explanation
for its peremptory challenge. 901 The court noted that the
891. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
892. Peart, 197 A.D.2d at 599, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
893. Id. at 600, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 425.

894. Id. at 599, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
895. Id.

896. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Batson, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution

prohibits the prosecution from using peremptory challenges for discriminatory
purposes. Id. at 96. Once the defendant establishes a prima facie case that the
prosecution's use of its peremptory challenges is discriminatory, the burden is
shifted to the prosecution to present a racially neutral explanation for its
challenges. Id. at 97.
897. Peart, 197 A.D.2d at 599, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
898. Id.
899. Id. at 600, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
900. Id. at 599, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
901. Id. at 600, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
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